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Preface 
 
In our capitalist societies, the State and the Market are never very far apart and well-functioning 
markets often go hand in hand with well-designed institutions and regulations. At a time when these 
are significantly redrawn by developments taking place both at the European level and at the national 
level, we cannot avoid a discussion about their adequacy and performance.   
This e-book, which is based on a Re-Bel event that took place in December 2013, analyses the quality 
and performance of Belgium’s regulatory set-up using the lenses of several key sectors. Jan Bouckaert 
and Axel Gautier’s piece primarily focuses on telecommunications and energy, while Paul De 
Grauwe and Yuemei Ji’s piece focuses on the banking sector. The choice of specific sectors serves to 
ground the diagnostic, but the emerging picture is not entirely dissimilar, and raises the issue (among 
others) of the insufficient independence of regulators in Belgium, both vis-à-vis the regulated sector as 
well as vis-à-vis the political power. Both contributions identify channels through which wrong 
incentives for the regulated firms are created. In his comments, Patrick Van Cayseele cautions 
however against a too hasty call for reform. Economic regulation is complex and involves many trade-
offs. We do not live in what economists call a “second best world” but rather a third or fourth best 
world. Together, the two lead pieces and Van Cayseele’s comments provide a useful first step towards 
a grounded and objective assessment of the performance of economic regulation in Belgium and I 
would like to thank all the authors for their contribution to this needed debate.  
 
 
Estelle Cantillon 
Université libre de Bruxelles 
Member of the core group of the Re-Bel initiative 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Lead Pieces
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Current Challenges in the Regulation of 
Utilities in Belgium1 
 
Jan Bouckaert (Universiteit Antwerpen and College of Europe) 
Axel Gautier (Université de Liège) 
 
 
Abstract 
This contribution to the Re-thinking of Belgium attempts to share our position on the current and 
future regulation of utilities in our country. We deliberately opt not to offer an exhaustive list of 
regulatory challenges based on thorough economic analysis. Our main goal is to participate in a 
welcomed open reform debate. The main messages are that we need (i) more stable and thought-
through policy visions resulting from sound economics, clearer roles for all actors involved, more 
coordination between regulators and (ii) less dependent regulators, less regulatory creep and fewer 
unnecessary low-powered incentive schemes. 
 
1. Introduction 
On October 13 2014, the Nobel Prize in economics was awarded to the French economist Jean 
Tirole for his outstanding contributions to the development of regulation and competition policy.  In 
the utility sectors that we will discuss in this paper, markets are still organized around a limited 
number of powerful firms and the need to regulate these sectors has not vanished even after years of 
privatization and liberalization.  Notwithstanding that, the objectives of regulators and the tools used 
to regulate firms have dramatically changed in the past decades.  Professor Tirole actively contributed 
to these changes by developing a new theoretical foundation to analyze market regulation.   
Incentives and asymmetric information are the cornerstones of Tirole’s theories.   Tirole, together 
                                                                          
 
1 The authors are thankful to Alexandre de Streel for his help with the talk that accompanied this contribution, to 
Patrick Van Cayseele and the participants at the Re-Bel meeting on ‘Corruption and Regulation in Today’s 
Belgium’ for their useful comments and remarks. We also would like to express our sincere gratitude to Estelle 
Cantillon for her encouragements to participate to this great Re-Bel initiative (#justdoit). We are grateful to 
Alexandra Pagano for excellent editorial assistance. Finally, we thank Philippe Van Parys and Paul De Grauwe 
for setting up Re-Bel and offering us this opportunity. 
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with Prof. Jean-Jacques Laffont—and many others after him—have developed powerful economic 
instruments to implement more effective and more efficient regulation of markets and regulators 
have started to use them.2 For these reasons, the Nobel Committee recognized that Tirole is ‘one of 
the most influential economists of our time.’   
In Europe, the regulatory landscape has changed considerably during the past decade.  Regulators 
use more and more sophisticated economic tools to curb down market power and to develop 
competition in the utility sector. The implementation of the new regulatory paradigm, which we 
discuss in the first section, is an extremely complex task, and governments and regulators continuously 
face new challenges.   
In Belgium, too, regulation does not always go smoothly.  The national press frequently echoes 
discussions and tensions between the governments, the regulators, the industry and the courts related 
to the organization of the markets, such as electricity and telecommunications.  These hiccups in the 
regulatory process are the starting points of our analysis. Based on that, we want to offer a non-
technical perspective on certain important regulation issues in today’s Belgium with respect to, 
although not exclusively, utilities like electricity and telecommunications. Our discussion offers a list 
of six issues that we consider important. Therefore, this paper has a modest aim. Our objective is not 
to present detailed recommendations for regulators and policy makers but rather to present general 
principles that should be kept in mind to further improve the regulatory process.3    
Our contribution is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a perspective on what role regulation plays 
in the organization of utility industries. Section 3 zooms in on six challenges for Belgium to further 
improve the regulation of its main utility industries. For each challenge, we offer our impressions 
based on casual, though, in our opinion, robust descriptions of current successes and shortcomings. 
Section 4 offers a short conclusion. 
 
2. The new paradigm for organizing network industries  
In this section, we briefly present the main regulatory framework currently applied in network 
industries.   
2.1 Liberalization of network industries  
                                                                          
 
2 Their work on optimal regulation has been collected in a textbook that appeared as Laffont and Tirole 
(1993). 
3 Our work complements those of Huveneers and de Streel (2009) and de Streel et al. (2011) who also 
discuss the regulatory challenges in Belgium.     
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It is often stated that in most industries, forceful rivalry between suppliers results in an outcome that 
more or less approaches what economists call “productive” and “allocative” efficiency. Interventions 
in the form of industry regulation in order to correct for too little productive and/or allocative 
efficiencies are then regarded as unnecessary.  Still, there are some industries in which rivalry is 
difficult or even absent for technical or natural reasons and in which regulation is regarded as central 
to an efficient organization of the industry. This is typically the case for the utility sectors—like e.g. 
rail, telecommunication, energy—where the presence of a large-scale infrastructure de facto limits or 
even prevents the development of competition. Because they require large (fixed) investment, 
networks are only viable if they concentrate a large fraction of the demand/traffic.  For this reason, the 
market can only bear a few players; at the extreme, infrastructure duplication may not be 
economically viable at all. For this reason, most countries had during decades one monopolistic 
(private or government-owned) supplier of energy, rail services or telecommunication before 
liberalization was introduced at the turn of this century, 
Liberalization has changed completely the picture. The new mantra has been “competition where 
possible, regulation if needed”. The gradual introduction of competition in the network industries can 
be summarized by four principles:4  
Vertical separation.  The supply-chain should be organized in several autonomous units.  The 
separation of the different units should be at least functional but it can be pushed further to a 
legal or a patrimonial separation. This is what has been done in the electricity sector where 
all components of the value chain (i.e. power generation, transmission (high-voltage 
network), distribution (low-voltage network) and retailing) are now mostly provided by 
different companies with different owners.  Vertical separation aims at identifying more 
precisely the cost of each production stage.   
Open access.  “Third-parties” can access the designated infrastructures if they need to, 
provided that they pay an access fee to the infrastructure owner.  The mandatory access 
obligation prevents owners of essential infrastructures to foreclose the market by excluding 
rivals.   The access fee should be cost-based –vertical separation proves to be useful in 
identifying the costs- transparent and non-discriminatory.   
Competition. Markets are open to competition and competition between rival suppliers is 
supposed to promote allocative and productive efficiency ultimately to benefit consumers.   
To provide services, competing firms can either develop their own infrastructure 
(infrastructure-based competition) or lease access from the existing ones (service-based 
                                                                          
 
4 See de Streel et al. (2011).    
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competition).  Thus, even if there remains a monopoly bottleneck in the supply chain, there 
need not be a barrier to create competition.  
Residual regulation. There is still a role for the regulators in liberalized markets.  For the 
segments that remain monopolistic, regulation should prevent the supplier from setting too 
high prices or to offer too low quality.  For this reason, network tariffs are scrutinized by 
sectorial regulators. For the competitive segments, regulation should promote competition 
by removing entry barriers and reducing switching costs.   
These general principles constitute the blueprint of market liberalization but, of course, the 
implementation of this blueprint varies across sectors, countries or even regions.  When we look at 
differences across sectors, it is clear that monopoly bottlenecks remain important in the energy sector, 
while they tend to disappear in telecommunications with the development of alternative networks 
(cable, fiber).   Table 1 classifies monopolistic and (potentially) competitive segments for these two 
industries and mentions the main regulatory tasks for both segments.    
 
 Competitive segments  Monopolistic segments  
Telecommunication  Voice telephony, Internet, TV 
services 
Local loop  
Energy  Generation, Retail services Transmission (high-voltage 
grid), Distribution (low-medium 
voltage grid) 
Need for regulatory 
intervention  
Promote competition by 
eliminating barriers to entry 
and switching costs  
Prevent abuse of dominance 
and cartels 
Network tariff regulation  
Universal service obligations  
Table 1: Competitive and monopolistic segments 
 
2.2 Multi-level governance  
Table 1 presents a blueprint of the role of regulation but its practical implementation is complex. 
Regulation has multiple players involved and they may interfere with each other.   To be short, we can 
distinguish four categories of actors: the political power, the sector-specific regulator, the judicial 
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system and the industry, and three levels of regulation: the European level, the Federal level and the 
Federal entities. At the European level, general principles for organizing the markets are laid down 
but their implementation remains in the hands of the Member States5 (and in Belgium this means 
that both the Federal level and the Regions are involved). At all levels, different actors are involved in 
the regulatory process.  The following table aims at presenting—in an extremely schematic way—the 
main role for each actor in the regulatory process.   
 
Actor Political power  Sector regulator  Judicial system  Industry  
Main 
regulatory 
role  
-Developing a 
long-term policy 
vision  
-Organization of 
the regulatory 
process  
-Ex-ante control: 
technical 
regulation, tariff 
regulation, 
universal service 
obligations  
-Ex-post control: 
compliance with 
the regulatory 
rules  
-Competition 
authority: ex-post 
control of abuse of 
market power and 
cartel behavior 
-Courts:  verify the 
legality of the 
regulatory process  
-Self regulation  
Table 2: The actors of the regulatory process 
 
3. Regulatory problems in today’s Belgium  
In practice, things are much more complex than pictured in the above table. Aubin and Verhoest 
(2014) conducted an extremely well-documented project on the organization and performance of 
telecommunications regulation across a number of European countries (The ‘REGUNET’ project), 
pointing at the organizational complexity of the regulatory process and the multiplicity of—possibly 
conflicting—relations between the different actors.  Their book offers a holistic perspective of multi-
level regulation in network industries, with a special focus on the Belgian situation.  Our goal is much 
more modest than the REGUNET project.  We identify six interrelated issues that we consider to be 
important in Belgium. We cover different topics including the necessity of a coherent policy vision 
(section 3.1), the institutional design (sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4), and the use of adequate regulatory tools 
(sections 3.5 and 3.6).     
3.1 Lack of long-term vision  
                                                                          
 
5 Therefore, the implementation of the common European framework varies across Member States.   
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Governments should have a long-term policy vision and coherent framework for the organization of 
network industries. Issues such as the evolution of the energy mix, the development of broadband 
infrastructures in areas with a low population density, or the future of rail transport are typical 
examples of policy questions on which policy-makers should take position. The regulator and the 
industry are then asked to operate within this framework. A long-term vision is necessary to avoid 
regulatory uncertainty and/or policy incoherence. This is particularly important in industries where 
large-scale investments are necessary. Indeed, firms operating in a regulated environment will be 
reluctant to invest if they are uncertain about the current and future rules of the game.  If the rules are 
changing too often, firms will fear expropriation of their investments and they will not invest in the first 
place. A stable regulatory framework is then a necessary though insufficient condition to promote 
investments and dynamic efficiency and, for that, policy-makers should know where they are headed.    
 
In our view6, the electricity market illustrates this lack of an integrated policy vision.  The separation of 
energy-related competencies between the Federal Government and the Regional Governments 
cannot alone explain the lack of a global vision. It resulted, along with other factors, in the 
plummeting of investments in non-renewable resources and Belgium’s inability to satisfy its energy 
needs.   In 2014, 21.9% of the electricity consumption in Belgium was imported from abroad, a 
historically high level.7  As such, this should not be considered as a fundamental weakness. The 
European ambition to have a European-wide energy market and an increase in cross-border energy 
trade could be a sign that markets are more and more integrated. However, there may be more than 
meets the eye. The increase in the imported energy is motivated by economic efficiency and the 
possibility of buying cheaper electricity abroad. As a consequence, power producers mothball 
domestic generation capacity due to high maintenance costs.8   However, one important and 
neglected aspect of an efficient electric system is its capacity to meet demand in all circumstances.  In 
Belgium this capacity has weakened and the threat of a blackout during this winter or the next cannot 
be excluded.     
For a long time, there has been no integrated view of the future of the energy market.  There have 
been specific policies for each energy source (nuclear, on-shore wind, off-shore wind, solar…). 
However, for the energy system as a whole, it is important to focus on the energy mix. The following 
examples illustrate some important shortcomings of current policies: 
                                                                          
 
6 See also de Streel et al. (2011).   
7 Synegrid (2015).   
8 Underused gas-fired plants, however, may serve a strategic role from a firm’s perspective. It limits the price for 
outsourcing generation (Bouckaert and Van Moer, 2014). Few hours of operation, may therefore be necessary 
though not a sufficient condition to mothball. 
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a) Nuclear phase-out. 
The Federal Government decided in 1999 on a progressive nuclear phase-out by 2025 but the law 
had an article (art. 9) that offered the possibility to deviate from the planned phase-out. This created a 
lot of uncertainty between 2003 and 2012.  It is only in 2012 that this art.9 has been deleted and the 
phase-out calendar has been determined.9  
b) Renewable energy subsidies. 
The development of renewable energy has largely been developed separately between the Regions 
and the Federal State. Subsidy schemes have been organized without much coordination and green 
certificates are either within regions or at the federal level only.  The lack of an integrated vision for 
the development of renewable energies created additional costs as we explain hereafter.   
c) Strategic reserves. 
The subsidies offered to renewable energy have created viability problems for the peak gas plants. 
Currently, subsidies for renewables make subsidies necessary for gas plants in order to guarantee 
sufficient adequate capacity. Non-profitable gas plants will be integrated in a capacity reserve and 
maintained by the grid operator Elia (the so-called ‘strategic reserve’) to face possible capacity 
shortage. The design of the provision of a strategic reserve, unfortunately, lacks many efficiency 
characteristics as described by Cantillon (2014). In particular, the current reserve capacity design (i) 
focuses on generation and therefore does not meet a neutral approach with regard to potential 
efficient contributors at the supply and demand side; (ii) relies on gas plants and therefore is not 
technology neutral; (iii) passes on all costs to consumers based on their consumption profiles and 
therefore lacks accountability from e.g. intermittent suppliers exerting a serious negative externality on 
the system. 
3.2 Confusion of roles   
In a multi-level regulation, many organizations participate in the regulatory process.  The role of the 
different parties should, however, be clearly identified. Hereafter we present three examples of 
confused roles that undermine the regulatory process.   
a) The nuclear rent.    
                                                                          
 
9 The current government subscribes to the agreed upon nuclear phase-out by 2025. There may, however, be 
a credibility problem given the continuing changes. 
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In 2011, the federal regulator (the CREG) and Electrabel were in conflict over the ‘nuclear rent’. The 
conflict was arbitrated by the National Bank of Belgium (NBB).   Conflicting views between a 
regulator and a regulated firm are not surprising. After all, both parties have diverging interests and we 
do not expect them to agree on all the issues. It is quite strange, however, that the NBB, in a dispute 
between the regulator and the main Belgian electricity producer, is regarded as the appropriate 
institution to arbitrate. If they disagree they should go to Court. 
b) Temporary price freezes can be imposed by the Belgian Competition Authority. 
The former Ministry for Economic Affairs (Federale OverheidsDienst Economie/Service Publique 
Fédérale Economie) has introduced the so-called “Price Observatory”. In the event the Price 
Observatory detects abnormal pricing behavior, whatever this may mean, it can hand over the file to 
the Belgian Competition Authority (BCA). The BCA then has the option to intervene, for example, 
by freezing price levels for a 6 months period. This possibility to intervene provides the competition 
authority with the power to act as a regulator to determine price levels. Of course, all affected parties 
can appeal by going to Court. However, this intervention power creates considerable uncertainty for 
firms as it puts aside the legal framework to be taken care of by competition authorities on the basis of 
competition law. Price regulation belongs to the role of the regulator. 
 
c) Horizontal Merger between Concentra and Corelio (Het Mediahuis) and vertical merger 
between Liberty Global and De Vijver Media. 
In 2013, the two largest media groups in Flanders, Concentra and Corelio, merged to form ‘Het 
Mediahuis.’ The Flemish Media Regulator (VRM) declared on the proposed merger:  
“Taken together, we must come to the conclusion that a concentration wave has taken place during 
the last years. The concentration wave has occurred in a horizontal, vertical, as well as in a cross-
media sense. These events call for increased vigilance from the side of policy makers with respect to 
diversity of news.” 10 (VRM, 2013) 
A similar remark has been made with respect to the vertical merger between Liberty Global and De 
Vijver Media (Vlaams Parlement, 2014). In both cases, there is a clear confusion with respect to the 
roles of parliament and the regulator: monitoring media diversity is not a mission of politicians.  
Neither is it a mission of the Competition Authority whose focus is on anticompetitive behavior and 
abuse of market power.  It should be the role of the media regulator, i.e. VRM itself. 
3.3  Regulatory independence  
                                                                          
 
10 Our translation from Dutch. 
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The role of the regulator is to implement sector-specific policies designed and proposed by the 
government and the legislator. One of the conditions for successful market regulation is regulatory 
independence. Regulatory independence is defined as the ability to act independently of private and 
public interests. Regulators will have this ability to act independently if, firstly, they have clearly 
specified missions and objectives (see 3.1 above). Second, if regulatory bodies have the human, 
financial and legal resources to effectively accomplish their tasks. And lastly, if the government and 
the regulated industry do not interfere in the day-to-day regulatory process i.e. they should be 
protected from undue influence from the market operators and the government. 
The liberalization process initiated at the European level calls for a mix of competition and regulation. 
To achieve an effective regulation, the principle of regulatory independence is clearly stated in the 
European rules that organizing the liberalized markets and regulatory independence is, in principle, 
guaranteed by the law. However, legal independence is not sufficient to guarantee real independence. 
Independence comes under pressure when there is proximity between the regulator and the 
regulated.  In Belgium, this proximity is a concern because public ownership remains important in 
regulated industries. Public authorities are still major actors in the telecommunication, postal, energy, 
water, rail and public transport sectors. This creates potentially a conflict of interest between the 
State as the owner of the regulated firm and the State as the industry regulator. The only way to 
prevent this conflict is to give a large formal (legal) and real (operational) independence to the 
regulator. Note that we do not claim that regulatory independence calls for the privatization of 
publicly-owned firms. Rather, we believe that an appropriate organizational environment should be 
guaranteed to successfully prevent potential conflicts of interests. We have several reasons to believe 
that this necessity of regulatory independence is not always well-understood by public authorities in 
Belgium. To illustrate this, we present three examples. 
a) Regulation in the rail sector. 
In the recently formed Michel Government (September, 2014), Minister J. Galant is in charge of the 
transport and mobility policies and holds the responsibility to oversee the public rail companies 
(SNCB/NMBS and Infrabel).  The problem—raised by the European Commission—is that the 
ministry of transport (SPF mobilité et transport/ FOD Mobiliteit en Vervoer) also supervises the rail 
and the air regulators.  Supervising both the main market player and the regulator potentially creates a 
conflict of interests.  On the one hand, the regulator is in charge of promoting and monitoring 
competition.  In this framework, one of its tasks is to deliver licenses and authorizations to new 
entrants. On the other hand, the historical operator may suffer from increased competition and it may 
prefer a restrictive licensing policy. There is a risk that the Minister in charge of supervising the 
regulation could be unduly influenced by the concerns of the main operator he/she supervises and 
fail to promote market competition by restricting the actions of the regulator. In these circumstances, 
regulation can hardly be totally independent.  In response to the Commission’s concerns, the 
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government recently decided to re-allocate the competence of supervising rail (and air) regulators to 
another Minister, W. Borsu in November 2014.   
b) Conflict of interest in the regulation of the telecommunications sector.  
On October 14, 2014, the European Commission (EC) decided to refer Belgium to the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ).  According to the EC, Belgian law does not offer sufficient guarantees of 
independence for the Belgian telecoms regulator, the Belgian Institute for Postal Services and 
Telecommunications (BIPT). According to EU telecoms rules, i.e. Article 3(3a) of the Framework 
Directive 2002/21/EC, telecoms regulatory authorities in Member States must act independently and 
not take nor seek instructions when applying those rules. However, according to Belgian law, the 
Belgian Council of Ministers can under certain circumstances withhold decisions made by BIPT. 
Importantly, BIPT must also obtain approval of its strategy from the government. The Belgian 
Government has not, as of now, complied with the formal request by the Commission in April 2014 
that Belgium guarantees the independence of its telecoms regulator. 
c) Regulation of electricity distribution.    
Recently, the organization of the electricity sector changed drastically.  First, the regulation of 
electricity distribution companies moved to the hands of the Regions in July 2014. Previously, this 
responsibility was in the hands of the federal regulator CREG. As a result of the 6th State Reform, the 
regional regulators, VREG (Flanders), CWAPE (Wallonia) and BRUGEL (Brussels), are now in 
charge of setting the distribution tariff which accounts for 35-40% of the household electricity bill. 
Second, the sector is on the way to consolidation with the recent mergers between distribution system 
operators (DSOs). 11  Last, there is a debate about the opportunity to move from mixed ownership of 
DSOs to full public ownership.12   
Policy-makers will then be on both sides of the regulator. On one side, they are involved in the 
management of the public DSOs and, on the other side, they decide on the policy choices made. 
This would be a fundamental problem if there is only one public DSO. There is a real risk, indeed, 
that policy makers bypass the regulator undermining its commitment capacity. If policy-makers 
bypass the regulator, regulation is no longer independent but possibly captured by short-term political 
considerations.  This would undermine the commitment capacity of the regulator and will be 
detrimental to long-term efficiency and investment. Recognizing this, the Managing director of the 
VREG, André Pictoel, explicitly asked for more independence for the regulator: «Being under the 
                                                                          
 
11 The number of DSOs has decreased from 24 to 10; currently, there are 7 DSOs in Wallonia, 2 in Flanders 
and 1 in Brussels.    
12 Electrabel owns stakes in Ores in Wallonia and Eandis in Flanders and currently negotiates with the 
municipalities to sell its ownership share.  
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responsibility of a Minister creates trouble », he said to De Tijd on December 6, 2013. «The Minister is 
dancing on a tightrope between regulation and policy. This leads to frustration on both the regulatory 
and the government’s side».13 
All this does not mean that public authorities can no longer intervene in the economy. Rather, the 
privileged instrument of public policy in a liberalized market should be sector regulation rather than 
public ownership.   
In our view, these three examples illustrate the confusion between two instruments for implementing 
an industrial policy in the utilities sector: regulation and public ownership. Traditionally, governments 
(and not only in Belgium) used public enterprises as their privileged instrument to conduct a sector 
policy.  Public ownership is a way to intervene directly—as an actor—in the market and to promote 
the public interest.14 Market liberalization requires the creation of a level playing field where firms—
public or private—can compete on equal footing. This implies an effective regulation of 
monopolistic segments and the promotion of fair competition in competitive segments.  When there 
are public firms competing in the market, governments may be tempted to implement a regulation 
that is more favorable to public firms. 15    
Independence is not only a way to prevent conflicts of interest, it is also necessary to give regulators 
strong commitment ability. In addition to tariffs, the regulated firm should also be provided with the 
correct incentives to make appropriate investments and produce efficiently. In this context, to favor 
long-term investments, regulatory uncertainty should be limited. The credibility of the regulator is 
important when offering the regulated firm the right incentives to invest appropriately in productive 
efficiency.   So, the commitment capacity of the regulator is necessary to induce the regulated firm to 
do what the regulator wants it to do.  
When the regulator lacks the ability to commit with respect to its regulatory intervention—e.g. 
because it changes its regulation too often, or does not reward the firm for efficiency improvements as 
foreseen in the regulatory contract, or does not punish the firm appropriately if it fails to become 
efficient—no firm will ever want to invest in the efficient production technology. Again, we insist on 
the necessity of a long-term vision.  
                                                                          
 
13 Our translation from Dutch. 
14 Governments usually have multiple objectives, sometimes even contradictory.   Coping with these objectives 
is often put forward as a main weakness of public organizations (Dixit, 2002).   
15 Bortolotti, Cambini, Rondi, and Spiegel (2011) document that regulated firms have a higher value when they 
have a state ownership, a phenomenon that is explained by the reluctance of governments to implement strong 
regulation when they own one of the regulated firms.   
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But regulators also have weak commitment power when politicians overrule them from time to time 
for electoral reasons. It is indeed very tempting for politicians to change the regulatory contract—for 
instance by decreasing tariffs—when the regulated firm reaches the efficiency level easier or earlier 
than expected. However, the regulated firm will only be willing to invest efficiently if it can reap the 
efficiency benefits. The power of politicians to intervene when it suits them and/or the lack of long-
run commitment by the regulatory authority therefore undermines the whole idea behind optimal 
regulation.  
In our view, preventing conflicts of interest and providing a strong commitment power to regulators 
are essential for the long-term efficiency of the utility sectors and, given their importance in the 
economy, to long-term growth. This means that regulatory independence should be reinforced.  In 
order to achieve this, regulators should have clear missions and objectives, real power to accomplish 
their task and they should be protected from private and public interests. 
In Belgium, this is, in our view, not sufficiently the case. This is partly because of the governments’ 
lack of a long-term vision—which hampers the role of regulators—and partly because governments 
have favored their role of shareholder at the expense of their regulatory role. This regulatory role is 
insufficiently developed in Belgium, as our few examples have illustrated, and it can certainly be 
further improved. To this end, governments should further reinforce the independence of the 
regulators formally in the law and effectively by providing clear objectives and the necessary 
resources.    
Our discussion so far has focused on the independence of regulators vis-à-vis the politicians and the 
“public interest.” We should stress, however, that regulators should also be independent from private 
interests. Indeed, there could be also conflicts of interests between regulators and the regulated 
industry, particularly if there are revolving doors between the regulator and the regulate, i.e. people 
moving from jobs in the industry or a political body to positions with the regulator or from the 
regulator to the industry or a political body.16 To limit the risk of capture of regulators by private 
interest groups, we recommend the introduction of a ‘cool-off’ period to restrict job mobility of this 
kind, similar to what exists in certain parts of the financial sector. 
3.4 Cooperation and coordination  
Liberalization of the network industries has been initiated at the European level with the ambition to 
create a competitive European-wide market.  Still, the implementation of these reforms is left to 
Member States.   Regulation, for instance, is organized at the national level and not at the EU level—
                                                                          
 
16 There are pluses and minuses here. It has been argued in the literature that regulators may be too myopic 
with their proposed regulatory policies and this may lead to suboptimal long-term investments. Revolving doors, 
then, could offer a remedy for this bias. Of course, this could be at the cost of increased collusion (Che, 
1995). 
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even if recently, regulators have organized platforms to coordinate their action at the EU level in the 
energy and the telecom sectors, for example.  Furthermore, in Belgium, Regions are also responsible 
for industry-specific policies, including some of the regulatory tasks. The organization of regulation is 
then complex since it takes place at different levels, with multiple parties, and different objectives (see 
Aubin and Verhoest, 2014). 
Delegation of regulatory tasks to the Regions is certainly not per se a bad thing.   It could prove useful 
to bundle policy objectives and financial responsibilities in the same hand to have a more coherent 
policy. For instance, before July 2014, Regions were fixing the universal service obligations imposed to 
electricity distributors, but the competence to set the tariff was still in the hand of the Federal 
regulator. Regions could then extract political benefits from having generous universal service, 
without bearing the responsibility of the tariff increase. The latest State reform corrected for this 
anomaly by moving the tariff responsibility to the regional regulator. This change in the 
responsibilities of the different public bodies improves the coherence of political action.   
In a market that is more integrated at the European level and where regulation takes place at the EU, 
the federal and the regional level, policy coordination is essential. This collaboration should take place 
both at the policy and the regulatory levels.  In our view, having dedicated forums to organize the 
coordination at the Belgian level is essential. Hereafter, we present two examples of a coordinated and 
a non-coordinated policy at the Belgian level. The first refers to the opening of cable networks to the 
competitors that was successfully implemented in Belgium.  Even though the authors of this paper 
believe that this policy may be counterproductive (see point 6 hereafter), it is a nice example of 
successful collaboration between the different regulators. The second example is the subsidy 
mechanism for renewable energy—the green certificates—that is totally non-coordinated between 
the regions. This mechanism has been criticized for its excessive cost. In this paper, we present the 
view that lack of coordination between the different levels may create additional transaction costs.    
a) Opening of the cable TV networks. 
The regulation of the telecommunication sector is the responsibility of both the federal regulator, 
BIPT (Belgian Institute for Post and Telecommunications) and the media regulator 
(VRM/CSA/Medienrat/BIPT). The BIPT is responsible for regulating the electronic communication 
markets with the objective of promoting competition, contributing to the development of the markets 
and protecting users.  The BIPT is, for instance, responsible for monitoring and implementing the 
mandatory third-party access to essential network components (like the local-loop) of the legacy 
network.  This policy, initiated by the EU, has been introduced to foster entry and the development of 
competition in the telecommunication sector. Media regulators are in charge of regulating the 
obligations of the media content providers and the service providers in their respective territory.   In 
this context, imposing access obligations to cable-TV operators, i.e. allowing third parties to use their 
network to supply services, required the cooperation of both regulators; cooperation that was 
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successfully organized at the CRC (Conference of Communication Regulators), a platform that 
gathers all the regulators.  
b) Promoting the use of renewable energy. 
In contrast, the market for electric power is organized partly separately across the different regions 
and partly jointly at the federal level. The promotion of renewable energy is (and was from the 
beginning) the responsibility of the regions. All regions chose the tradable green certificate 
mechanism to promote renewable energy (an alternative like a guaranteed price was opted for in 
Germany, for instance). Green certificates are used to guarantee that energy supplied is coming from 
renewable sources. Producers of renewable energy receive green certificates and these certificates 
can be traded on the market.  On the supply side, renewable energy producers offer their certificates 
for sale. On the demand side, electric power providers have the legal obligation to offer a certain 
percentage of (certified) renewable energy or otherwise pay a fine. On the certificate market, the 
price fluctuates between a guaranteed floor price and a ceiling price (corresponding to the fine), 
depending on supply and demand. The certificate price corresponds to the subsidy paid to renewable 
energy generation. The system aims at encouraging efficient investment in renewable energy. If, 
given the certificate price, a renewable power unit is ‘in the money’, installing this unit is profitable.  
Conversely, if a unit is ‘out of the money’, the investment is not financially viable and the power unit 
should not be installed.  At equilibrium, the market should encourage the production of renewable 
energy at the lowest possible cost.  Of course, organizing the system on a larger scale increases the 
possibility of trade and therefore decreases the cost of greening the energy supply. 
From the beginning there was no possibility of 'cross-border' trade between regions, and the norms 
and standards are different in the two regions.  On top of that, there is a third (federal) mechanism 
that supports off-shore wind mills, as the North Sea “belongs” to the Federal State (from a 
constitutional perspective). This is a typical example of non-coordination between regulators. The 
absence of coordination is detrimental. While CO2 reduction targets are set at the EU level and at the 
Belgian level, the mechanisms in place are set on a smaller scale, which reduces the effectiveness of 
the system. 
3.5  Low-powered regulation   
An important part of the economics of regulation studies the optimal design of regulation. Laffont 
and Tirole (1993) have devoted an entire research program to this field, published their results in 
academic journals, and collected their main findings in their classic textbook. A complete overview of 
the optimal design of utilities regulation is clearly outside the scope of this article. However, to sketch 
the central theme, the main question is how the regulator, in a world with asymmetric information, 
can find out the regulated firm’s real costs.  
Suppose the regulator proposes to the regulated firm a single contract such that the firm receives a 
fair return on top of its reported costs. If the regulator cannot observe the firm’s costs, the firm has an 
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incentive to report higher costs. By doing so, the firm can enjoy a higher return by fooling the 
regulator. Laffont and Tirole’s proposed solution to circumvent this problem was to let the regulator 
offer the regulated firm a choice between contract options. The proposed contracts are designed in 
such a way that the regulated firm has an incentive to reveal its true cost structure. That is, if the 
regulated firm has an inefficient cost structure, it would prefer to choose the contract that stresses a 
compensation for costs (C-contract). In sharp contrast, if the firm is very efficient, it would prefer the 
contract that stresses the price at which it can sell (P-contract). The main difference between the two 
contracts is as follows. The C-contract does not invite the firm to lower its costs and inefficient 
production persists. That is, the C-contract is characterized by “low-powered” incentives. A nice 
example is a “cost-plus” contract whereby the regulated firm is paid a fair return rate on top of its costs. 
The P-contract, however, is a “high-powered” incentive scheme; it provides incentives to the firm to 
reduce its costs because lower costs increase the firm’s profit margin if the price is fixed. A classic 
example is a “price-cap” contract. 
Countries like the United Kingdom or The Netherlands have introduced variants of “high-powered” 
incentive regulation in many regulated industries, including the electricity and water distribution 
industry. Examples are policies in which regulated firms get penalized if and only if they 
underperform with respect to comparable regulated firms; i.e. yardstick or benchmarking-based 
contract schemes. In sharp contrast, most utility sectors in Belgium are still regulated on the basis of 
their costs, and can therefore be regarded as characterized by low-powered incentives. A recent 
example is the regulation of tariffs for Distribution System Operators (DSOs) in Flanders. Tariffs for 
2015-2016 will be based on historic costs: 
“The historic evolution contains an unbiased and transparent basis for the evolution of costs during the 
next governing period.”17 VREG (2014), p. 32. 
It is unfortunate, in our view, that the recent State Reform did not take advantage of the opportunity 
to introduce more high-powered incentive schemes. Sophisticated benchmarking techniques across 
the different DSOs18 within or even across the different regions and methods to make use of high-
powered incentive schemes, enhance efficiency and further serve consumers’ interests would have 
been a nice opportunity. 
3.6 Regulatory creep   
Belgium is one of the few countries in the world with close to full coverage of two fixed broadband 
infrastructures for residential households and businesses. The first infrastructure is a DSL-network 
                                                                          
 
17 Our translation from Dutch. 
18 Policy makers in Flanders have even suggested to merge all DSOs to one monopoly, making benchmarking 
or yardstick competition impossible. 
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and originates from the cupper network owned by the incumbent telephone operator. The other 
network was used by TV-distributors and is usually referred to as the cable network.  
Typically, we refer to inter-platform competition when the incumbent DSL operator and operators 
with other infrastructure, most notably cable (but possibly also fiber-to-the-home and wireless) 
compete to attract customers on their networks. Intra-platform competition refers to competition 
between different DSL-operators making use of one single (the incumbent’s) network. Under 
facilities-based intra-platform competition (so-called unbundled local loop, or ULL), entrants lease 
bare unbundled local loop elements from the incumbent network, but have to invest in their own 
equipment and other facilities to get access to their customers. Under service-based intra-platform 
competition (such as bitstream access), entrants merely compete with each other by reselling the 
incumbent’s services and therefore incur little-to-no own investments.  
While consumers in Belgium can choose between these two distinct networks to buy broadband 
services, there is detailed access regulation for operators with significant market power. Detailed 
access regulation has been introduced at the time of the liberalization of this network industry in 1998. 
While cable did not have to open up its network for access to third parties until recently, access to the 
DSL-network was always regulated heavily. The details of the access regulation shape the degree of 
competition between the networks and on each network. 
In a study on OECD countries, Bouckaert, van Dijk, and Verboven (2010) concluded that—in 
addition to important external factors like income/capita, PC penetration, and differences in 
population density—the existence of inter-platform competition has a significant, positive effect on 
the penetration of broadband use in the population (i.e. the fraction of the population using 
broadband). Broadband penetration tends to be 10% higher in a country where DSL and cable have 
equal market shares, compared to a country without a cable operator. Facilities-based intra-platform 
competition was found to have an insignificant effect on broadband penetration. In contrast, service-
based intra-platform competition has a significant, negative effect on broadband penetration. But the 
magnitude of this effect is less important than that of inter-platform competition. 
The main conclusion of Bouckaert, van Dijk and Verboven (2010) is that differences in regulatory 
policies play a crucial role in explaining differences in broadband access and penetration. Countries 
that promoted competition between different platforms (e.g. by investing in cable infrastructure) have 
done significantly better. In contrast, countries that mainly promoted service-based intra-platform 
competition on the incumbent’s network have, on average, done worse. These findings are consistent 
with the view that service-based competition does not provide sufficient investment incentives to new 
entrants and, importantly, discourages investment of the incumbent operator. In particular, 
discouragement of investment stems from the incumbent, who is not willing to bear all the risks while 
receiving only a regulated part of the investment rents. 
22 
 
 
Table 3 – Regional differences within Belgium 
Variable Belgium Flanders Brussels Wallonia 
Dependent variable     
Broadband penetration (fraction of households) 59% 63% 60% 52% 
Competition variables*     
Market share cable 39% 55% 33% 28% 
Market share DSL incumbent 46% 36% 49% 53% 
Market share other licensed operators (OLOs) 13% 7% 9% 17% 
- of which unbundled local loop 2% 2% 6% 3% 
- of which bitstream access 11% 6% 3% 14% 
Market share others 2% 1% 10% 1% 
Control variables     
Net taxable income/capita (€, fiscal year 2006) 13,655 14,483 11,550 12,807 
PC-penetration (2007) 67% 72% 64% 61% 
Population density (population/km2, 2007) 345 448 6,601 202 
*: Belgian market shares are taken from 13th EU Implementation Report (2007). 
(http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/communications_reports/annualreports/13th/index_en.h
tm); regional market shares are estimates based on 2008 market survey by Belgacom; split of OLOs between unbundled 
local loop and bitstream access is based on estimates by Belgacom. Source: Bouckaert, van Dijk, and Verboven (2010). 
In the only case study on Belgium to our knowledge, the authors also revealed interesting additional 
insights. Belgium as a whole used to be a frontrunner in the early years. Recently, however, it slowed 
down and now belongs to the intermediate group of OECD countries with a household penetration 
level of 59% in 2007 (see Table 1). Behind this national number there are large regional differences: in 
Flanders, penetration reached 63%, compared with 60% in Brussels and only 52% in Wallonia. An 
important part of these differences may be explained by external conditions. Indeed, Table 1 shows 
that Flanders had a higher income/capita, a higher PC-penetration and a higher population density, 
which are all conducive to broadband penetration as mentioned earlier.  
However, the differences in broadband performance are also in part due to the differences in regional 
policies. Investment in cable broadband was actively promoted in Flanders from the start, which 
resulted in a strong degree of inter-platform competition. In Brussels and especially in Wallonia, the 
promotion of inter-platform competition did not take place. Instead, there was more emphasis on 
service-based intra-platform competition (bitstream access). Table 1 indeed confirms that in 2007 
cable broadband had reached a market share of 55% in Flanders, compared to only 33% in Brussels 
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and 28% in Wallonia. Conversely, bitstream operators had reached a 14% market share in Wallonia 
versus only 6% and 3% in Flanders and Brussels.  
From an international perspective, the authors conclude that Flanders has benefited from promoting 
inter-platform competition. In contrast, Wallonia focused on service-based intra-platform 
competition, entailing adverse investment incentives. They complement their findings with three 
policy recommendations for Belgium to improve broadband penetration: 
1. Policy-makers should develop a long-term vision and promote inter-platform competition: 
The “ladder of investment” theory argues that it is good to promote intra-platform 
competition as a stepping stone for new entrants to induce them to invest. The case study for 
Belgium shows there is no support for this theory, and that, to the contrary, intra-platform 
competition may even give adverse investment incentives. To improve broadband 
penetration, the promotion of inter-platform competition should become a priority. 
2. Policy-makers should gradually phase out bitstream access regulation: Our econometric 
results suggest that service-based intra-platform competition is worse than facilities-based 
intra-platform competition, which is neutral in this respect (it neither encourages nor 
discourages penetration). We therefore recommend as a first priority to phase out bitstream 
access regulation, for example, by gradually increasing regulated bitstream access prices 
relative to ULL prices, or by not imposing mandatory bitstream access on new optical fiber 
networks, where substantial investments still need to be made.  
3. Policy-makers should not follow a “one size fits all approach” and pay attention to regional 
differences that affect broadband penetration: Our case study for Belgium shows that 
external conditions may explain large regional differences, but regional policy is also partly 
responsible. In regions that are lagging behind, policy makers should assess whether the right 
regulatory and investment policies are followed and focus sufficiently on inter-platform 
competition to preserve the right investment incentives. 
 
4. Conclusions  
Our contribution stressed six challenges towards further improvement of regulating utilities industries 
in Belgium. A first challenge stresses that the Federal and Regional Governments have an important 
role in safeguarding a policy vision which is stable and long-term based. Distribution of roles between 
government, regulators, competition authority and appeal courts should be made clearer and 
constitute a second challenge. Third, independence of federal and regional/community regulators 
should be guaranteed, as has been recently challenged by the European Commission for the 
telecommunications sector. Fourth, coordination between the different regulators within each 
regulated sector should be further encouraged. As a fifth challenge, we would like to see less 
regulatory creep. Last but not least, we are strong proponents of a greater use of regulatory 
instruments that provide high powered incentives, such as benchmarking or yardstick competition.  
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We realize and subscribe to the idea that rethinking Belgium should not be motivated by economic 
reasoning only. However, it should be of no surprise that it is our conviction that Belgian policy-
makers could make use of more economics to build their policies on, not less. 
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Why Have Banks Remained Fragile?  
Paul De Grauwe (London School of Economics) 
Yuemei Ji (Brunel University) 
 
 
1. Introduction: Plus ça change plus cela reste la même chose 
There has been a significant tightening of regulation of banks since the banking crisis of 2008.  Basel 
III has raised minimum capital ratios and redefined riskiness of assets. In most countries banks have 
been subjected to significantly more regulations.  Yet when we look at ratio of capital+reserves to total 
assets of banks, little seems to have changed. We show this in Figure 1.  
In Belgium, France and Germany there is no significant increase in the ratio of capital+reserves to 
total banks’ assets.  In the UK, where that ratio had declined a lot before the crisis, it increased 
significantly since 2008,  and now has reached a level much higher than in three continental 
European countries where these ratios continue to be very small (only 5% in Belgium and Germany).  
 
 
Source: European Central Bank, Consolidated Banking Data 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/consolidated/html/index.en.html 
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Thus it appears that the fragility of banks in Belgium, France and Germany is as high as before the 
crisis. If the value of the banks’ assets in Belgium, France and Germany declines by a few percentage 
points capital will be wiped out and will push these banks over the precipice again. The surprising 
thing is the inertia in the movements of capital ratios, and thus in the fragility of banks, despite the 
considerable change in the regulatory environment. 
Several questions arise: 
 Why do banks in many continental European countries continue to hold too little capital?  
 Why do we observe differences between countries? 
 Why does the political system not seem to have succeeded in making banks less fragile in many 
continental European countries?  
 
2. Why do banks continue to hold too little capital? 
In 2013 capital and reserves of banks in the EU amounted to only 7.6% of total balance sheets. Well-
run businesses outside the banking sector typically hold equity shares of 20%, 30% or more of their 
balances sheets. For good reasons; these well-run firms know that shocks can occur in the future that 
can wipe out large parts of their balance sheets. Good business strategy then leads these firms to hold 
sufficiently large buffers to avoid bankruptcy. 
These principles of good behavior do not seem to apply to banks. Admati and Hellwig(2013) have 
identified the main cause of the low equity shares in banks’ balance sheets. This is the “too big to fail” 
syndrome. Large banks profit from an implicit guarantee from their governments that will not allow 
these institutions to fail. As a result of this guarantee, banks can issue debt at very favourable terms. 
This in turn gives them an incentive to issue cheap debt and to avoid issuing equity that does not profit 
from government guarantees. Thus the fundamental reason why large banks issue too much debt and 
too little equity is that they profit from the subsidy implicit in government guarantees.  
 
3. Why do we observe differences between countries? 
The value of the implicit subsidy from government guarantees clearly depends on the financial 
strength of the government. A guarantee given by the Greek government to Greek banks is worth less 
than a guarantee given by the German government to German banks. As a result, the implicit subsidy 
enjoyed by Greek banks is likely to be much lower than the implicit subsidy enjoyed by German 
banks. One should expect, therefore, that Greek banks issue less debt and more equity than the 
German banks.  
This theoretical prediction can be tested using data of equity shares of banks in the EU. We present 
these in Figure 2. The figure shows capital plus reserves as a percent of the total balance sheets of 
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banks in the major Eurozone countries (+ the UK) at the end of 2012. It is striking to find that the 
Northern European countries’ banks have very low equity shares, typically 5% or less. In contrast the 
banks in the countries of the periphery (Spain, Ireland, Greece) have equity shares exceeding 10%. 
The banks in the former countries are backed up by financially strong governments; the banks in the 
latter countries have to rely on the guarantees form financially weak governments. Thus, it appears 
that indeed banks located in countries with financially solid governments use the strong guarantees 
provided by their governments to issue a lot of debt at the expense of equity. The opposite occurs in 
countries with financially weak governments. 
In order to test this hypothesis further we used the level of the 10-year government bond yields as a 
measure of the financial strength of governments. The lower is the government bond yield, the 
stronger the financial position of the government, and vice versa.  
We now plot the shares of capital + reserves on the vertical axis and the 10-year bond yield (our 
measure of financial strength of the government) on the horizontal axis in figure 3.  We find a 
significant positive relation. Banks in countries with low government bond yields (high financial 
strength) have low levels of equity; banks in countries with high bond yields (low financial strength) 
have high levels of equity. We explain about 50% of the total variation of the equity ratios by the 
government bond yields19.  
 
 
                                                                          
 
19 In De Grauwe and Ji (2013) we provide more econometric evidence confirming the positive relationship 
between capital and the government bond yield and we discuss possible endogeneity problems. 
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 Source: European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse 
 http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=2018811 
Note: The data presented here relate to the Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) as 
defined by the ECB. The vast majority of euro area MFIs are credit institutions (i.e. 
commercial banks, savings banks, post office banks, credit unions, etc.), which 
accounted for 82.4% of such institutions (6,210 units) on 1 January 2012, while money 
market funds represented 16.9% (1,275 units). Capital + reserves corresponds to core 
capital.  
 
 
Source: European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse 
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=2018811 
 
It should be noted that in countries were the government bond rates are high banks typically will have 
to pay high interest rates on the debt they issue. These high interest rates then reflect the risk premium 
investors want to have given that the low value of the government guarantee creates a credit risk. 
These high interest rates in turn give banks incentives to issue less debt and more equity.  
The previous analysis allows us to uncover a paradox. Northern European banks today profit from the 
financial solidity of their governments and follow business strategies aimed at issuing too much 
subsidized debt. In doing so, they weaken their balance sheets and become more fragile, less able to 
withstand future shocks.  The paradox then is that financially strong governments breed fragile banks. 
The opposite occurs in countries with financially weak governments. In these countries banks are 
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forced to strengthen themselves, unable to rely on their governments. The result is that they have 
significantly more capital  and reserves (more than twice as much as in some Northern countries) and 
have become less fragile. Financial fragility of governments breeds financially stronger banks.  
This is not to deny that banks in Southern Eurozone countries do not have problems of their own (see 
Ayadi, et al. (2012), Gros (2013), European Central Bank (2013)). In general the size of non-performing 
loans is high in these banks and higher than in Northern countries’ banks. This may also be a reason 
why these banks have been forced to hold higher capital ratios.  
The paradox that financially strong governments breed fragile banks is not easy to solve. In Northern 
European countries the large but financially fragile banks hold their governments hostage. As a result, 
despite their strong financial resources, the governments in these countries are politically weak, 
unable to resist the pressure of the banks to keep equity low. 
Yet this is what should change. More than in the South, the governments of the Northern European 
countries should stand up and force the banks to issue more equity. This should go much further than 
what is foreseen in the Basel III accord. If the experience of the Southern European countries is any 
guide, banks in the North of Europe should at least double the capital and the reserves as a percent of 
their balance sheets. Failure to do so risks destroying the financial solidity of the Northern European 
governments when, in the future, negative shocks force these governments to come to the rescue of 
their undercapitalized banks.  
The new responsibilities entrusted to the European Central Banks as the single supervisor in the 
Eurozone creates a window of opportunities for that institution to change the regulatory and 
supervisory culture in the Eurozone that has allowed the large banks to continue to live dangerously 
with insufficient capital. 
 
4. Why has he political system not succeeded in making banks less fragile in many EU-countries 
We see two reasons. The first one has to do with regulatory capture; the second one with the use of a 
wrong regulatory model. 
Regulatory capture 
The “too big to fail syndrome” analysed earlier provides an implicit subsidy to banks. This subsidy 
granted by financially strong governments provides the basis and the means for the lobbying effort of 
banks to maintain subsidy. And this effort is the strongest in the fiscally strong countries, like 
Germany. It leads to the maintenance of low capital ratios. 
Wrong regulatory model 
The regulatory model of Basle III is based on philosophy that assets of the banks can be divided in 
different risk classes. Some assets are risky; others are not or much less so.  Banks have to set a lot of 
capital against the former, but none or much less against the latter. The result of this regulatory 
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philosophy is that banks develop various ingenious methods to minimize the issue of capital. They do 
this by camouflaging the risky assets or by different forms of securitization of risky loans, thereby 
shifting the risk off their balance sheets.  
One example of this “regulatory arbitrage” has been the emergence of “Capital Relief Trades” 
(CRTs) whereby banks transfer part of the risk of their loan portfolio to a third party, most often a 
hedge fund.  The latter allows the same banks to show embellished capital ratios, i.e. capital ratios that 
increase when banks shift the risk off their balance sheets. 
In a way it can be said that this regulatory model has fallen victim of a “fallacy of composition”. The 
regulation that is applied to the individual bank risk seems to have led to lower perceived risk and 
higher risk adjusted capital ratios. For the system as a whole, however, nothing has changed. The risk 
has just been shifted elsewhere. One can even argue that systemic risk has increased because the 
system has become more interconnected.  
The permanent shifting around of the “hot-potatoes” of risk makes it more likely that relatively small 
shocks are more easily propagated throughout the entire system. When a systemic crisis breaks out, all 
the assets of the banks at risk, including those assets that are risk-free under normal conditions. In the 
current regulatory philosophy no capital has to be posted against these “risk-free” assets. 
A better regulatory approach consists in recognising these systemic risks and in forcing the banks to 
set capital against all the assets they hold on their balance sheets. In this way, banks will no longer have 
the tendency to do " regulatory arbitrage "; a tendency that has produced a situation in which banks 
hold approximately the same low amount of capital as a percent of their total balance sheet as they 
used to have prior to the crisis. The result is that banks today are no less fragile than they used to be 
before the crisis. 
Basle regulators have recognized this problem when they have proposed the introduction of maximal 
leverage ratios.  But these maxima have been set too high to make much difference.  
The approach proposed here must of course be complemented by more direct control of risk taking 
by banks. In my view this implies separating investment from commercial banking activities. 
Unfortunately, the political momentum to go in this direction has come to a complete standstill.  
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Commentary 
 
Patrick Van Cayseele, Associate Dean Research Affairs, FEB, KU Leuven and Research Fellow, 
Duisenberg School of Finance, Amsterdam. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In my comments, I first highlight the similarities and differences in the problems identified by 
Bouckaert and Gautier, and De Grauwe and Ji. This is to see whether some general conclusions can 
be drawn regarding the improvement of the regulatory framework that is in place, or whether the 
matter is so complex that only tailor-made solutions can be put forward. 
In the third and fourth section I then scrutinize some of the arguments given by respectively 
Bouckaert and Gautier, and De Grauwe and Ji. A fifth section offers some personal conclusions and a 
recommendation. 
 
2. Similarities and differences between the contributions 
Both papers deal with the regulation and supervision of industry/financial services. Bouckaert and 
Gautier deal rather exhaustively with public utilities in Belgium, while De Grauwe and Ji investigate 
banks for a number of European countries. As such, these contributions focus on prominent 
examples of regulated industries, leaving aside a number of other sectors where regulation interferes 
with the competitive process (such as pharmaceutical, pharmacies, insurance, etc.). 
In their focus, both papers document the importance of regulatory independence. In Bouckaert and 
Gautier, the focus is mainly on the (lack of) independence of the regulator from general government 
(politics), while De Grauwe and Ji focus on the captivity of government by the regulated industry, in 
casu the banking sector. While Bouckaert and Gautier investigate a number of specific mechanisms 
that lead to interference between politics and regulation, De Grauwe and Ji document an implicit 
contract that is prone to moral hazard: banks are too big to fail and hence bank creditors rely on the 
implicit guarantee that the government will bail them out when things go wrong. 
Finally, both papers point to a lack of effectiveness of regulation. In Bouckaert and Gautier, the focus 
is on conflicting goals and the resulting overregulation when a host of agencies interfere with the 
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competitive process, while De Grauwe and Ji argue that regulation is insufficient to ensure financial 
stability. 
Bouckaert and Gautier focus rather explicitly on the relationship between horizontal (competition 
policy) and vertical (sector) regulation whereas in De Grauwe and Ji, this aspect remains uncovered 
although it is present, because strong central government guarantees may constitute hidden state aid 
which should be reviewed/ cleared by the European Competition authority. 
 
3. Remarks on the arguments by Bouckaert and Gautier 
3.1. Multiple regulators and fuzzy regulatory outcomes: la condition humaine 
Bouckaert and Gautier refer to the REGUNET project (regarding the organization and performance 
of regulation of telecom companies) to document a host of interrelated issues that affect the 
performance of the telecommunication industry. In the same spirit, they identify six problematic areas 
and also document the issues involved in other industries, including energy, rail and the media. 
While each and every identified problem area (whether it is the lack of long-term vision, the 
confusion of roles, or the lack of coordination) is a valid consideration; in my view many of the 
problems originate in a more fundamental issue, namely the choice that needs to be made when a 
multilevel regulatory process is designed. Since the work of Sah and Stiglitz (1986), it is well known 
that the fundamental choice is between a polyarchy and a hierarchy. The strengths and weaknesses of 
these two systems have become known. In a polyarchy, each regulatory agency can make a decision 
that binds the other. This implies, for example, that when a merger involves media companies, the 
media regulator can clear the merger when it considers that the merger proposal offers significant 
guarantees for the diversity of news, regardless of considerations regarding the competitiveness of the 
market (which is under the supervision of the competition authority). 
Needless to say, this organisation of supervision leads to a “regulatory supermarket”, where the firm 
can “shop around” to find a regulator in favour of the project (since one regulator’s decision binds the 
other). This creates the impression that “everything goes” and that government is weak vis-à-vis “those 
who know the appropriate channel.” 
The opposite of “polyarchy” is “hierarchy.” The term is somewhat misleading in that it creates the 
impression that one regulator or agency can overrule the other. The idea, however, is that each 
agency in a hierarchy has to clear the project before it passes. In this system, each agency has a “veto” 
power. This implies that a project only stands a chance of approval if it meets the concerns of each 
and every regulator. In reality, projects will often satisfy one regulatory goal (say more financial 
stability when a larger banking group is created) but not another (the larger banking group may be 
detrimental to competition). 
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As a result, a large number of projects are “killed” and the impression is that regulatory activity is too 
strict, leading to a situation characterised by “sclerosis”, in which nothing ever changes because there 
is always some party (regulatory agency) that opposes the project. 
 
3.2.  “Seamless integration”, confusion of roles or blurred competencies 
Bouckaert and Gautier argue correctly, on the basis of a number of cases in Belgium, that roles in the 
regulatory process are not clearly identified. The “seamless integration” between the horizontal 
(competition policy) and vertical (sector) regulation is not a solution to the problems documented in 
section 3.1. above. In their table 2, Bouckaert and Gautier present in a schematic way the main roles 
of each actor in the regulatory process. 
I tend to agree with most of what is in table 2, except for the time horizon attributed to political power, 
which is a normative view on politics rather than a positivist one. To correct for short-termism in 
politics, I think that the long term policy vision should also be a consideration of sector regulators, 
who ex-ante should think of a blueprint for the structure, conduct and performance of the industries 
that they regulate. This is because it is hard for political actors who are elected on the basis of 
changing preferences and attitudes of voters to commit for the long term. 
Beyond the distinctions between sector regulation and the judicial system (of which the competition 
authority is a part), which Bouckaert and Gautier do mention, I think there is a number of further 
differences that explain why the “seamless integration” of horizontal and vertical regulators has hardly 
ever been a success. Specifically, I think that the scope and nature of information used in the decision 
making process are very different. As said, regulation should deal ex-ante with the entire industry 
configuration. Competition policy deals ex-post with some firms. Also, the information used in the 
regulatory process is public in nature, while competition policy on the other hand uses private 
information. 
It is well-known that regulators face asymmetric information, for instance when they try to set optimal 
tariffs for public monopolies who know their costs (while the regulator doesn’t). But this is a different 
issue: the information used in the regulatory process, as it concerns multiple firms and the public, 
should be fully available. Competition policy on the other hand will often deal with business secrets 
that cannot be disclosed in the decision process. This may create the impression that certain aspects 
of the problem remain hidden. Especially when the ex-post control of abuse of market power, which 
is a difficult and lengthy process, takes a lot of time, the call for a regulator to “step in” would be great. 
However, the (fortunately) few cases where this was the case (Bouckaert and Gautier discuss some 
examples) show that the outcome hardly can be qualified as a success. 
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4. Remarks on the arguments by De Grauwe and Ji 
Some 25 years ago, when a serious leap forward in European Monetary Integration was taken with 
the Second Banking Coordination Directive, I wrote together with D. Heremans: 
 “In general, it is known that a country’s reputation can “spill over” to the company level, and that 
countries which have a “good” reputation, for example, regarding quality, provide a competitive edge for 
their companies. In particular, the “domino”-effect implies that the bankruptcy risk of an individual bank 
is directly related to the risk of financial system breakdown. (Van Cayseele and Heremans (1991), p. 93, 
second alinea). 
I’m therefore sympathetic to the argumentation by De Grauwe and Ji who argue that banks located 
in countries with financially solid governments appear to use the strong guarantees provided by their 
governments to issue a lot of debt at the expense of equity. The point simply is that the government’s 
reputation is a substitute for the individual banks’ reputations. Or to put it yet another way, since 
equity is costly, banks located in strong countries free ride on the reputation of their governments at 
the expense of banks located in countries with governments that can only give weak guarantees. 
However, the empirical evidence does not convince me entirely, because a few nagging questions 
remain, while a competing explanation for the observed facts exists. 
 
4.1. Nagging questions 
Belgium, notwithstanding a substantial government debt to GDP ratio (which normally should 
constrain the Belgian government to provide massive guarantees), belongs to the group of countries 
in which bank capital plus reserves as a percentage of the balance sheet is low (and below the EU 
average) (figure 2 in their text). So are Belgian banks even more risk-loving than other banks in that 
they even issue more debt without the backing of government, and why does the public “buy” this? 
In general the argument according to which the Northern European banks succeed in convincing 
their regulators that they need to keep less capital and reserves because they are backed by guarantees 
of strong governments is puzzling, as this would imply that these regulators are fully captured by the 
banks that they are supposed to regulate and no longer watch over the general interest (the fact that 
their governments don’t need to come up with bailouts because capital and reserves are a sufficient 
buffer). Usually, we think of regulators in countries such as Finland, the Netherlands and Germany as 
very competent and independent. But not in banking then? 
Finally, why does Europe buy this? If it is true that Northern European banks cash on the guarantees 
(implicitly or explicitly) provided by their governments, they should have a lower cost to income ratio, 
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which provides them, especially in a pan-European and global banking market, with a competitive 
advantage. In that case, DG COMP would need to investigate whether this is an admissible form of 
State Aid. 
 
4.2. An alternative explanation and the need for further investigating moral hazard and too 
big to fail arguments. 
An alternative explanation could be that the Northern European banks have been more innovative in 
certain areas of banking, which can lead to a lower need for capital and reserves banks. For example, 
when the process of securitization, that allows to move risks off balance, went further. This is not 
necessarily better, for it can move risks from a controlled environment into shadow banking where 
risks remain more hidden. But if done properly in a financial market (rather than a predominantly 
financial institutional) environment, it could have improved risk allocation, leading to a reduced need 
for buffers. 
Is this to say that the concerns expressed by De Grauwe and Ji are unjustified? Not at all, moral hazard 
is a well-documented phenomenon. Cheng and Van Cayseele (2011) show that during the Asian 
financial crisis, Chinese banks that were covered by guarantees or were sure to be bailed out, indeed 
continued growing in terms of balance sheet. Yet, using the same methodology, Reynders and Verbist 
found that this effect was not present for Belgian banks during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. 
Regarding moral hazard, economists know that it potentially exists, but further empirical work is 
needed to document when and where it is likely to emerge. In order to conclude that it generates the 
patterns seen in the Northern European banks balance sheets, one needs to exclude other 
explanations and show why usually tougher (at least perceived as such) regulators are captured. 
Certainly given the fact that it is hard to change the established practices in this area, see Calomiris 
(2013). 
 
5. Conclusion 
Two contributions written “without fear or favor” have been presented at this re-thinking Belgium 
event. Only by pointing in a candid way the current regulatory deficiencies, can an agenda for 
improvement be set up. 
Bouckaert and Gautier document many problems with the regulation of utilities. My main message 
here is that it is necessary to explain that multi-level regulation will always face the fundamental trade-
off between too weak and too strict regulation. De Grauwe and Ji point to the continued fragility of 
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banks and my main message there was that before triggering changes, we need to exclude other 
explanations (the change from the relational to the transactional banking paradigm) touching on the 
fundamental trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency (innovation). 
Overall then, I’m more on the conservative side (at least in comparison to these contributions). But I 
think that in rethinking Belgium, it is also important that we do not conclude too quickly that 
everything is bad, and that before implementing change, we should identify the good aspects of the 
regulatory framework of this country, and try to keep those alive. 
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